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Introduction
The Supreme Court of Canada's 1999 Meiorin decision has become a well-known landmark in Canadian human rights law, labour and employment law, disability law, and discrimination and equality jurisprudence more generally (British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission v British Columbia Government and Service Employees' Union (B.C.G.S.E.U.) (Meiorin Grievance) ] 3 SCR 3 [Meiorin 1999 .
1 Canadian courts and arbitrators have cited the case well over 500 times, and, with only minor exception, its clarification of the approach to adjudicating discrimination claims, its emphasis on substantive equality, and its articulation of the employer's duty to accommodate under human rights law has been widely praised and followed (Sheppard 2001) . 2 In its journey to iconic status as a modern classic of Canadian law, however, Meiorin's factual context as a case of physical standards for employment has faded from view, at least for many lawyers. By contrast, the case occupies a central place among the researchers and experts engaged in the study, science, design, and implementation of physical standards of employment (Gillis and Darby 2001; Gledhill and Bonneau 2001) . Within both legal and scientific communities, Meiorin is too often treated as a rigid set of rules divorced from its factual origins. A better understanding of Meiorin's facts, its *Associate Professor, University of Alberta, Faculty of Law. I thank Michael Ginevsky, Lauren Chalaturnyk, and Siobhan Powlowski for research assistance. I also thank Stewart Petersen for several illuminating conversations, and for the insightful feedback of several anonymous reviewers. 1 For context see Fudge, J. and Lessard, H. 2010 foundational principles, and its conceptual compatibility with international approaches, sets the stage for a more productive and widely applicable articulation of the best way to navigate the interaction of physical standards for employment and human rights concerns not only in Canada but across the common law world.
The Meiorin case began, not in the wood-panelled courtroom of the Supreme Court of Canada, or in Tawney what was scheduled to be the crew's penultimate day at the site, cable friction or an engine malfunction in the logging machinery sparked a fire on the wood-strewn forest floor. The work crew swung into action battling the blaze, as required by British Columbia's Forest Act. After a few hours, the crew pulled out briefly while British Columbia Forest Service water bombers doused the flames. In the early afternoon, the crew returned to deal with the remaining hot spots from the ground. At that point, under the direction of the government Forest Officer and Weldwood managers, six workers, including Kingston, were sent down a steep embankment to spread water on an area of previously felled lumber. Kingston, a large 250-pound man, ventured furthest down the hill -a dangerous place to be. The wood debris along the slope, cut the previous year, was dry and highly combustible. Suddenly "the wind changed and the fire … more or less exploded," one of the crew recalled. Surrounded by wind-fed flames the workers D r a f t scrambled up the 75-meter cliff and towards the logging road. "When I saw the fire move I hollered at everyone to get out," the crew's manager recalled. "Between the roaring of the fire, the smoke and the heat, (Kingston) was overcome." When he died, Kingston was less than five meters from the safety of the road (Buttle 1991; Devlin 1991; Fraser 1991; Jackson 1991 ; The Sunshine Coast News 5 August 1991, p.1).
The ensuing Coroner's Inquiry Report, issued by D.A. Devlin, 29 November 1991, offered a series of recommendations to the British Columbia government and forest industry.
Crucially, the Report noted that there had been confusion in the chain of command during the fighting of the fire and that Kingston "had received no formal training to fight fires." In addition to stressing the need for forestry companies to better train and prepare its employees to suppress fires, the Report recommended that "only workers who are physically fit and familiar with working in heavy brush conditions should be assigned front-line firefighting tasks" (Devlin 1991 ). The Coroner's recommendations led directly to the physical standards for employment that Tawney Meiorin failed.
Kingston's death is a powerful reminder of the inherent dangers of many workplaces. In Canada, as a matter of occupational health and safety legislation, criminal law, and common law, employers must provide, insofar as possible, a safe and healthy work environment for their employees. 3 It is equally clear that in some occupations, including emergency responders and 3 See, for e.g., Alberta's Occupational Health and Safety Act, RSA 2000 c O-2, s 2(1) which obligates employers to "ensure, as far as it is reasonably practicable … to do so … the health and safety of" its workers. In addition, the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s. 217.1 provides: "Everyone who undertakes, or has the authority, to direct how another person does work … is under a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent bodily harm to that person, or any other person, arising from that work". As Justice MacDonnell wrote in a recent sentencing decision under s. 217.1, R v Kazenelson, 2016 ONSC 25 at para 45: "persons in positions of authority in potentially dangerous workplaces have a serious obligation to take all reasonable steps to ensure D r a f t 6 heavy industry, public safety and property is also at stake in effective job performance. In appropriate settings, physical standards for employment are among the important ways that employers can maintain and enhance workplace safety for workers and the public alike by ensuring that individuals in potentially dangerous working conditions are able to safely manage the physical demands of the job. But the accident that led to Kingston's death and the testing that resulted from it also reveals the ways in which physical standards for employment can be inappropriately transplanted from one context to another, or implemented with discriminatory impact. If the lesson of Kingston's death is about the need to protect workers and the public from harm, it is also about the need to tailor those protections in light of human rights values, and to insist that the imposed standard is directly and closely connected to the specific workplace at issue. This article is about approaching the legality of physical standards for employment with these lessons in mind. I argue that, if designed and implemented appropriately, physical standards for employment promote rather than inhibit workplace achievement of human rights objectives. From this perspective, physical standards for employment, when attentive to human rights and diversity concerns, play an important role in the creation of safe, just, and equitable workplaces.
Part I: Discrimination at Work
Physical standards for employment consist of employer-mandated requirements for employees to hold or continue employment. Such requirements typically take the form of physical tests that replicate, insofar as possible, the physical demands of the job. As Bruno Zumbo helpfully explains, employers, often with assistance from specialists, translate a that those who arrive for work in the morning will make it safety back to their homes and families at the end of the day." D r a f t 7 "conceptual version of the desired level of competence, i.e. the performance standard" into a "cut-score on the test" as a delineation of acceptable and unacceptable performance (Zumbo 2016) . The employer's use of such standards and tests in making important employment decisions -who to hire, fire, or retain -directly engages two fundamental legal concepts:
freedom of contract and workplace human rights.
In its purest form, the common law doctrine of freedom of contract recognizes the right of individuals entering contracts, including employment contracts, to set the terms of that contract free from legislative restraint or judicial interference (Atiyah 1979) . As the United
States Supreme Court famously held, "[i]n making contracts of employment, generally speaking, the parties have equal right to obtain from each other the best terms they can by private bargaining" (Morehead v New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 US 587 (1936) ). In Canada, like most other common law jurisdictions, freedom of contract remains among "the fundamental commitments of the common law of contract" (Bhasin v Hrynew, [2014] 3 SCR 494, para 70).
Accordingly, among the most important contractual freedoms recognized by the common law is the decision of whether to enter into a contract first place, or to continue a contractual D r a f t 8 fields of employment and limited workplace opportunities. 4 Despite the persistence of subtle and systemic forms of workplace discrimination, the human rights revolution in the latter half of the twentieth century had a profound impact on employment law across the common law world.
With the framing of the Second World War as a fight for individual rights and freedom against Nazi racism and oppression, the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and social, legal, and labour movement activism against on-going civil liberties abuses, a new attention to domestic human rights protection swept across Canadian legal and political culture, just as similar movements took shape across the western world (Adams 2009; Clément 2008 ).
The first legislative steps to protect human rights in Canada were tentative. In 1944,
Ontario prohibited the publication or display of "any notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other representation indicating discrimination or an intention to discriminate against any person … because of the race or creed of such person" (Racial Discrimination Act, SO 1944, c 51, s 1).
Saskatchewan followed with the first comprehensive provincial bill of rights, providing that "[e]very person … shall enjoy the right to obtain and retain employment without discrimination … because of the race, creed, religion, colour or ethnic or national origin of such person" (Saskatchewan Bill of Rights, SS 1947, c 35, s 8) . Although symbolically important, the absence 4 In the period before the arrival of human rights legislation, the law generally responded to workplace discrimination in two ways. In some instances, governments wrote sexism, racism, and prejudice directly into the formal law itself, by denying government contracts to certain visible minorities. Far more prevalent, however, were the informal lines, barriers, and quotas among private and public employers that prevented full participation in the workforce: applications ignored, promotions denied, terminations expedited. This form of legalized discrimination fit squarely within the traditional common law conceptions of employment and the freedom to contract, as the unfettered rights of private parties to act as they saw fit. It is worth noting two features of this first wave of human rights legislation. First, the legislative concern was employment discrimination based on race, religion, ethnic, and national origin. 7 For the most part, discrimination on the basis of sex or gender was not prohibited.
5 The Act's preamble declared: "it is contrary to public policy in Ontario to discriminate against men and women in respect of their employment because of race, creed, colour, nationality or place of origin; … it is desirable to enact a measure designed to promote observance of this principle; and … to do so is in accord with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as proclaimed by the United Nations". 6 In Canada, human rights commissions, like the regulation of employment itself, generally fall within provincial jurisdiction. The exception is employment at a handful of federally-regulated industries, such as aeronautics, banking, and telecommunications, which fall under federal constitutional authority. Accordingly, employment and labour relations are overwhelmingly regulated at the provincial level. Employment standards legislation sets a number of minimum contractual conditions (pay, maximum hours of work, amount of reasonable notice to terminate) that the parties to a contract cannot, either implicitly or explicitly, avoid. Labour relations legislation governs unionization and the collective bargaining of workplaces. Occupational health and safety legislation obligates employers to provide and maintain a healthy and safe work environment. Human rights law prevents employers from refusing to hire or to continue to employ individuals on the basis of a set of prohibited grounds of discrimination. Employment at federally-regulated industries is governed by the Canada Labour Code, RSC 1985 c L-2 and the Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6. 7 Although the federal Canadian Bill of Rights, SC 1960, c 44 protected against discrimination within federal laws on the grounds of "sex," the legislation had little impact on employment and labour law. On the contrary, the Canadian Bill of Rights became infamous for a series of judicial D r a f t
Neither did early human rights codes protect individuals from discrimination based on physical or mental disability (Pothier 2010 (Pothier -2011 . Secondly, the prohibition against workplace discrimination -albeit on a relatively narrow list of grounds -was absolute. Early human rights codes contained no exception for what would later become known as bona fide occupational requirements. As sex discrimination continued in the workplace and as the women's movement increasingly demanded the extension of human rights protection to women, sex was added as a prohibited ground of discrimination, first in British Columbia in 1969, and to the other provincial human rights codes in the years which followed (Clément 2014 (1964)). Ironically, the last-minute insertion of "sex" among the prohibited grounds was likely a ploy by opponents of the legislation to defeat it by extending its protections to women (Miller Jr, 1966-67, p. 879) .
Although the effort to derail the legislation failed, the addition to the grounds of discrimination prompted Congress to include the defence of "a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise" as a way of softening the legislation's impact. 8 Early commentators correctly identified that the phrase offered "the key to the enforcement of the act" (Miller Jr, 1966-67, p. 879) . Although, as Miller pointed out,
he language is at best ambiguous, and admits of a wide range of possible interpretations" (Miller Jr, 1966-67, p. 879) .
interpretations by the Supreme Court of Canada that seemed to entrench existing inequality on the basis of sex (AG Canada v Lavell, [1974 ] SCR 1349 , and Bliss v AG Canada, [1979 1 SCR 183). 8 Notably the defence only applied to claims of discrimination on the basis of "religion, sex, or national origin". Race was excluded.
The American legislative concept of a bona fide occupational qualification as a full defence to a claim in employment discrimination migrated first to Alberta's Human Rights Act in 1966 (although without the addition of sex as a prohibited ground of discrimination). In 1969, when British Columbia added sex to its list of prohibited grounds it included the qualification that "discrimination because of sex, where based on a bona fide occupational qualification, does not constitute" a breach of the Act (Human Rights Act, SBC 1969, c 10, s 5). In the decade that followed, every Canadian human rights statute prohibited sex discrimination alongside some variation of the concept of a bona fide occupational qualification (Clément 2014, p. 74) . That remains, more or less, the governing statutory landscape in Canada today, although several jurisdictions have moved to use the preferable language of a "bona fide occupational requirement" as opposed to "bona fide occupation qualification". Similarly, "physical disability" first appeared as a protected ground in New Brunswick's human rights legislation in 1976, before spreading across the country in the ensuing decade (Pothier 2010 (Pothier -2011 .
If freedom of contract makes possible the setting of physical standards of employment as elements of the employment contract, human rights norms and the legislation which enforce them provides the legal limits of those standards. Prospective employees who fail to pass a physical standard for employment test and fail to obtain a job, or incumbent employees disciplined or terminated for failure to pass an employer-imposed test, will have a human rights claim in the event that the test discriminated against them on the basis of a protected ground of discrimination, such as sex/gender, physical disability, or age, and failed to qualify as a bona fide occupational requirement. Some other statutes define discrimination, 9 while others specify that a bona fide occupational requirement requires individual accommodation to the point of undue hardship. 10 In reality, none D r a f t 13 of these differences, beyond a few small variations in the prohibited grounds themselves, have tended to matter in practice. 11 Courts, human rights commissions, and labour arbitrators alike have confirmed in all Canadian jurisdictions that, regardless of small differences in wording, discrimination in employment, including any legal challenge involving physical standards for employment, is to be adjudicated on the basis of the conceptual framework established by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Meiorin decision.
To the extent physical employment standards and the tests that arise from them pass human rights challenge (either directly under human rights legislation or indirectly as incorporated into workplace collective agreements), they are fully lawful in the employment context. To the extent that they discriminate and fail to qualify as bona fide occupational requirements, they are illegal and may give rise to claims in damages. Regardless, physical standards for employment expose employers to human rights litigation and workplace grievances. Despite varying statutory contexts, physical standards for employment raise similar legal issues across the common law world. Yet while the scientific research community behind the creation and study of physical standards for employment has long been informed by international conversations and collaboration, the human rights and legal dimensions have remained tenaciously limited by national boundaries. A look behind the distinctive legal 10 Ontario's Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H 19, s 11, for e.g., provides: "The Tribunal or a court shall not find that a requirement, qualification or factor is reasonable and bona fide in the circumstances unless it is satisfied that the needs of the group of which the person is a member cannot be accommodated without undue hardship on the person responsible for accommodating those needs, considering the cost, outside sources of funding, if any, and health and safety requirements, if any." 11 As Chief Justice Lamer held in University of British Columbia v Berg, [1993] 2 SCR 353 at 373: "If human rights legislation is to be interpreted in a purposive manner, differences in wording between provinces should not obscure the essentially similar purposes of such provisions, unless the wording clearly evinces a difference purpose on behalf of a particular provincial legislature."
language of common law countries, however, reveals a world of overlapping issues and common solutions.
Part II: Comparative Context: Unites States, United Kingdom, and Australia
Not surprisingly, workplace discrimination and its adjudication under human rights norms raise similar legal issues across the western world. Despite structurally and conceptually similar legal systems among common law countries, most jurisdictions have developed their particular jurisprudence concerning the legality of physical standards for employment in isolation from one another. We have already seen, however, that cross-border influences between the United States and Canada played an early role in shaping Canadian human rights legislation, an international rights conversation that touched many other national legal systems as well.
There are important lessons to be generated from a comparative analysis of the case law of different national jurisdictions, and a common best practices approach to physical standards of employment that can be utilized regardless of national context. (Pub L 101-336, 104 Stat 328 (1990) ). 13 In Griggs, the Court held that "practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices" (Griggs 1971, p. 429) . 14 "What is required," the Court held, "is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate" (Griggs 1971, pp. 429, 431) . In a poetic turn, the Court held that "tests or criteria for employment or promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox….The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity" (Griggs 1971, pp. 429, 431) . 15 Since neither of the tests imposed in Griggs "is shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used," they could not pass legal muster (Griggs 1971, pp. 429, 431) .
Recall, however, that cases involving discrimination on the basis of race, as opposed to religion, sex, or national origin, under the Civil Rights Act are not subject to the defence of bona fide occupational qualification. Although Griggs helped to elucidate the American approach to 12 In Canada, the same concept is referred to as "adverse effects" discrimination. Despite obvious differences in legislative wording and comprehensiveness, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia each employ a reasonably similar model of dealing with workplace discrimination, at least on paper. All jurisdictions prohibit direct and indirect forms of employment discrimination upon similar grounds. Similarly, each jurisdiction allows for limited exceptions on the basis of particular job requirements, and, in some cases, an additional duty that an employer must accommodate individual applicants and employees to a reasonable degree. Canada and the United States have the most developed jurisprudence in relation to physical standards for employment and perhaps greater receptivity to equality rights challenges of workplace rules, but it is safe to say that judicial outcomes in the United Kingdom D r a f t and Australia concerning physical standards for employment if and when they originate will roughly track outcomes in North America, although the different wording among the applicable statutes and differences in legal cultures may account for variations at the margins.
What a survey of common law countries does make clear, is that although there has been considerable overlap and mutual influence among the key legal concepts and legislative language in play, the Canadian jurisprudence on physical standards of employment is arguably the best developed and consistent, in large measure because it is the only jurisdiction where the highest appellate court has directly dealt with a case involving physical standards for employment. For this reason, Meiorin may prove to be an important decision not only in Canadian human rights law, but potentially in international contexts as well. Regardless of its actual international impact, the legislative and judicial approach in Canada to physical standards for employment bears scrutiny and emulation for its effective balancing of human rights and diversity concerns, workplace safety, and contractual freedoms.
Part III: Building Conceptions of Equality into Workplace Standards
Any discussion of physical standards for employment in Canada will naturally focus on Meiorin. Tawney Meiorin began work as a contract firefighter in British Columbia in 1989. In the spring of 1992, the government employer hired her as a member of an Initial Attack Crew -a small team designed to fight and suppress early-stage forest fires. She worked the following summer under a similar arrangement. In both years, Meiorin's offer of employment stipulated that she was to pass a physical employment test; in neither year did any testing actually occur.
She appears to have performed her job reasonably well. As the 1994 season approached, the government employer insisted that Meiorin pass (and re-pass throughout the term of D r a f t employment) a physical test -the one created in response to Ernest Kingston's death and the Coroner's Inquiry recommendations that followed. As Justice McLachlin (as she then was) explained: "The Tests required that the forest firefighters weigh less than 200 lbs. (with their equipment) and complete a shuttle run, an upright rowing exercise, and a pump carrying/hose dragging exercise within stipulated times" (Meiorin 1999, para 6). Because of a previous knee injury, the employer excused Meiorin from the shuttle run and required instead that she complete a two-and-a-half kilometer run in less than eleven minutes. Meiorin failed the test three times, on the last occasion by 49.4 seconds. The government employer terminated Meiorin from her employment as a result.
Meiorin challenged her termination under the terms of her collective agreement (which referentially incorporated British Columbia's human rights legislation) on the basis that the physical standards for employment discriminated against her on the basis of sex. The government defended the termination on the grounds that "it is necessary periodically to test a person's physical fitness for the job … to ensure that he or she is and remains fit to perform the job safely and effectively" (Respondent's Amended Factum at para 43). Although an earlier grievance arbitration had upheld the legality of physical testing job requirements for British Columbia forest fire fighters, Meiorin won her arbitration on the grounds that she had "performed her job as a forest firefighter satisfactorily in previous years without any concerns about her ability to perform her job safely and efficiently," and that the testing both discriminated against her and failed to accommodate her to the point of undue hardship (British
Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission v British Columbia Government and
Service Employees' Union (Meiorin Grievance), [1996] Meiorin was not the Supreme Court's first opportunity to interpret the meaning of statutory prohibitions on employment discrimination under human rights legislation. The Court had already developed, although without unanimity, the elements of bona fide occupational requirements to include subjective good faith, objective reasonable necessity, and individual accommodation to the point of undue hardship (Ontario (Human Rights Commission) 489, p. 513-14) . Until Meiorin, however, the Court had suggested that the applicable test may differ when dealing with direct discrimination (e.g. women need not apply) as opposed to adverse effects discrimination (e.g. employees must be six feet tall) (Ontario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v Simspons-Sears, [1985] Since Meiorin, the operative three-part test "for determining whether a prima facie discriminatory standard is a bona fide occupational requirement" requires an employer to establish on a balance of probabilities as follows: 1) that the employer adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job;
2) that the employer adopted the particular standard in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfilment of that legitimate work-related purpose; and Unquestionably, the Court's constitutional conception of substantive equality, its concern for the equal worth and human dignity of all persons, its attendant commitment to reviewing facially neutral standards, and its attention to the serious consequences of job loss informs its 19 On the inherent vulnerability of employees see Machtinger v HOJ Industries Ltd., [1992] Employers designing workplace standards owe an obligation to be aware of both the differences between individuals, and differences that characterize groups of individuals. They must build conceptions of equality into workplace standards. By enacting human rights statues and providing that they are applicable to the workplace, the legislatures have determined that the standards governing the performance of work should be designed to reflect all members of society, in so far as this is reasonably possible (Meiorin 1999, para 68).
In theory, if not always in practice, that commitment means that Canadian courts and tribunals will remain sensitive to systemic workplace discrimination. It seems likely that public employers will also increasingly face pressure from the public and government to address systemic underrepresentation of women and minorities in the public workforce, such as municipal fire fighters, and to examine the ways that using physical testing or ranking candidates according to such physical testing may contribute to reinforcing dominant patterns of workplace exclusion.
Nevertheless, the Court in Meiorin devotes very little attention to spelling out precisely why and how the physical standards for employment at issue discriminate. Recall, the onus lay on Meiorin to first prove on a balance of probabilities that the testing discriminated against her on a prohibited ground, "sex". In Meiorin, the Court agreed with the original arbitrator that the "aerobic standard discriminates against her as a woman," without much explanation or analysis.
"Because of their generally lower aerobic capacity," the Court held, "most women are adversely affected by the high aerobic standard" (Meiorin 1999, para 68). What is unclear from this D r a f t wording is whether virtually every physical standard for employment that tests, to a significant extent, speed, strength, or endurance will therefore prima facie discriminate against women because of the inherent physiological differences between men and women (Roberts et. al 2016; Cox and Messing, p. 25) . 20 In Meiorin, the Court adopted the arbitrator's holding that that "the test does have a discriminatory effect on women because women are less able to do aerobic work than are men. That is because of different physiological characteristics when women are compared with men" (Meiorin 1996, para 172). As the Supreme Court of Canada recently held, "to demonstrate prima facie discrimination, complainants are required to show that they have a characteristic protected from discrimination under the Code; that they experienced an adverse impact with respect to the service; and that the protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact" (Moore v British Columbia [2012] 3 SCR 360, para 33). In other words, regardless of the presence or absence of women test subjects in devising the physical standard, test, and cut score, it remains the case that virtually any testing mechanism that relies substantially upon physical strength, speed, or endurance is likely to be found to prima facie discriminate against women, as well as other individuals based on the protected grounds of disability and, in some cases, age.
It is also irrelevant in determining whether a test prima facie discriminates on the basis of sex, whether some women are capable of passing the physical test, with or without training. By definition, the physiological differences between men and women will give some men a systemic advantage in most physical standards testing. The same general advantages will also usually hold 20 As Cox and Messing explain, "although there is always overlap between women's and men's performance in terms of strength and aerobic capacity, because of biological differences, we can generally expect that most women will not perform as well as most men on current physical employment tests. Men and women differ in terms of size, shape, muscle mass and energy metabolism. Length of body segments, body weight, and lifting ability are distributed differently by sex but with considerable overlap" (Cox and Messing, p. 25) .
true for able-bodied individuals in physical tests, compared to individuals with physically disabilities. In all likelihood, of course, the individual challenging the workplace decision will have failed to pass the imposed test. There may be certain kinds of physical standards with attributes for success distributed evenly across the population, which will not systemically discriminate against a group protected under human rights legislation. However, many physical tests for employment, especially ones dependent on strength, speed, or endurance, will constitute prima facie discrimination on the basis of sex, and often physical disability and age as well, if statutorily protected groups experience a more than trivial disadvantage in passing the test when compared to the majority population of participants. Thus far, Canadian courts have avoided defining disadvantage in rigid statistical terms akin to the 80% rule often employed in the United
States. Canadian courts have thus far tended to prefer qualitative over quantitative measures, although fact finders and arbitrators will continue to rely on expert assessment of whether inherent group physiological capacities played a measurable role in an individual's inability to meet a cut-off score. Courts will often be further emboldened to make a prima facie finding of adverse effects discrimination since it is just the beginning, and not the end, of the analysis. The real legal issue on which virtually all such cases will turn is whether the physical standards of employment can be saved as bona fide occupational requirements. It is at that point that the design of the standard, test, and cut score, and the incorporation of diverse test subjects in their creation, may help to insulate the physical standards of employment from human rights challenge.
Within Meiorin's three-part test an arbitrator, tribunal, or court will almost always focus on step three: whether the "standard is reasonably necessary" to accomplish a "legitimate workrelated purpose" and whether it is possible to accommodate the employee (and others like her or D r a f t 30 him) "without imposing undue hardship upon the employer". In Meiorin, the onus fell on the government employer to demonstrate "that this particular aerobic standard is reasonably necessary in order to identify those persons who are able to perform the tasks of a forest firefighter safely and efficiently" (Meiorin 1999, para 72). In essence, the third step involves two discrete inquiries: the first into the imposed standard itself: its origins, purposes, design theory, and relationship to actual employment requirements; and secondly into the possibility of accommodating the individual given the demands and characteristics of the particular workplace involved. On the first issue, the Court in Meiorin laid particular stress on two problematic aspects of the research design of the impugned running test. First, the Court pointed out that the researchers had developed the standard based on "average performance levels of the test subjects" as opposed to a focus on actual job performance-based needs. And secondly, that in devising those averages the researchers had failed to distinguish between "male and female test subjects" (Meiorin 1999, paras 9, 74) .
In Meiorin, the Court held that the focus of the design and implementation of the test should have been on the "minimum aerobic capacity to perform the job safely and efficiently" (Meiorin 1999, para 76) . In other words, to qualify as a bona fide occupational requirement, a physical employment standard must represent a minimum (as opposed to an average or even preferable) level of safe and efficient job performance. Employers must be prepared to demonstrate with evidence, preferably in the research design and validation of the test itself, why a particular physical standard for employment offers an important job-related minimum threshold below which the job cannot be safely and efficiently performed. Employers will have an easier time of doing so if they can demonstrate that the physical standards, tests, and cut-off scores were derived from methodologically sound observation and testing of a diverse cross-
section of individuals capable of performing the job safely and efficiently. The closer the nexus between the resulting physical standard test and the actual skills required and performed on the job, the more likely a tribunal or arbitrator will uphold the standard as a bona fide occupational requirement.
If an employer is able to demonstrate that a physical standard for employment qualifies as "reasonably necessary," it will additionally need to prove that it is impossible to accommodate the rights claimant to the point of undue hardship. A properly designed and implemented testing mechanism will go a long way to satisfying this portion of the test as well. That is, it will be far easier for an employer to demonstrate why individual accommodation of an employee unable to meet a particular standard will pose an undue hardship where the employer has already demonstrated that the required standard is a necessary minimum threshold sufficiently related to performance of the job. 
D r a f t
What Meiorin also makes clear is that simply asserting that a standard relates to safety will not be sufficient to qualify a physical standard for employment as a bona fide occupational requirement. Rather, a court will look specifically to evidence that the employer has made an individualized decision in relation to the employee, and that the employer engaged in a process of consideration rather than an automatic assumption that an individual cannot be accommodated. In this regard, an employer must consider available reasonable alternatives which do not alter "working conditions in a fundamental way" (Hydro Québec v Syndicat des employé-e-s, [2008] 2 SCR 561, para 16). In essence, human rights law requires an employer to defend with reasons why this particular employment standard has been imposed, and why this particular employee and others like her cannot be accommodated, considering factors such as prohibitive expense, onerous inefficiency, and compromised safety. Often answering these two queries will turn on the same considerations: the legitimate and demonstrable safety and efficiency concerns of the employer.
Despite the hundreds of occasions on which Meiorin has been cited in Canadian courts, relatively few cases have involved physical standards for employment. This may be in large part because employers moderated a number of physical tests in the wake of the Meiorin decision.
After Meiorin, for example, the forestry company, Weyerhaeuser, abandoned its minimum bench press test and agreed to change its fitness test for millworkers to correlate "directly with the job being advertised" (Bolan 2000) . Rather than placing equality concerns and safety in tension with one another, as much of the case law and literature appears to assume, I think it better to approach both workplace safety and workplace equality concerns as emanating from the same basic commitment to the individual worth and dignity of each person. To that end, physical standards for employment related to specific aspects of the job which protect individuals from harm equally reflects and embodies human rights values to security of the person. In short, an unsafe workplace disregards the human rights of its workers and the public by placing persons unnecessarily in harm's way.
But human rights are also promoted by a diverse workplace in which differently abled individuals are able to bring their unique skills and perspectives to work, including ideas about how a job might be performed in different and perhaps even safer ways for everyone. Properly D r a f t calibrated, and equally respected, the interaction of physical standards for employment and human rights law achieve both human rights goals -security and diversity in the workplace.
Conclusions
In seeking the best practices of physical standards for employment it will be incumbent on test designers and employers alike to be mindful of the human rights implications of the design, implementation, and use of such testing. The modern generous and liberal approach to interpreting human rights legislation exhibited across the common law world, and the wide array of grounds of discrimination such legislation covers, especially sex, physical disability, and age, means that physical standards for employment will continue to face legal challenge. To the extent that physical standards for employment test skills related to strength, speed, or endurance, arbitrators and courts will likely continue to find that such testing prima facie discriminates on the basis of systemic physiological differences and physical capacities between majority participants and individuals falling within protected grounds of discrimination. To survive such scrutiny, physical employment testing will need to qualify as bona fide occupational requirements by satisfying a framework of justification, whether established by Meiorin, or another similar legislative and jurisprudential context. Whatever the national setting, physical standards for employment will need to be rationally connected to the job, and devised and implemented in good faith. Most crucially, physical standards for employment will need to be defended as reasonably necessary to the safe and efficient performance of the job. Accordingly, employers should employ standards, tests, and cut-off scores that adequately capture the minimum requirements to do a job safely and efficiently. This is generally best achieved with tests derived from a cross-section of actual satisfactory job performers which rely on criterion validation (actual job specific skills evaluated against a specific set of defensible criteria), as D r a f t opposed to construct validation. Equally important will be an employer's processes for considering the accommodation of employees unable to meet the required standards. Courts have not held employers to an impossible standard to find work for everyone in all circumstances, but a demonstrated process of reasonable and reasoned deliberation that results in specific reasons why accommodation will pose undue hardship will satisfy a court, tribunal or arbitrator more readily than a blanket appeal to workplace safety.
Like so many areas of the law, the legality of physical standards for employment comes down to a question of balance. Legislative language may assist to guide that balance, but, ultimately, where judges, arbitrators, and human rights commissions draw lines between lawful and discriminatory physical testing standards will depend as much on the surrounding human rights culture and its judicial acceptance as the precise wording of formal legal enactments.
Accordingly, conceptually similar legal regimes may yield entirely different outcomes in similar cases involving physical standards. That said, this article's review of several common law human rights regimes reveals a relative convergence of the operating concepts at work, despite the differences in the language in which those concepts are expressed. There is likely little difference between concepts like adverse effects and adverse impacts discrimination, a bona fide occupational qualification and a bona fide occupational requirement, reasonable accommodation and reasonable adjustment. What can be said with confidence is that lawmakers around the world appear driven by a strong desire to state the same legal principle slightly differently. And yet it is equally clear that, in the main, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia have developed human rights structures in unacknowledged influence of one another. In their own ways, each strives to find the appropriate balance between recognizing the human rights D r a f t values of a workplace free from discrimination with the reality that some forms of work require some physical abilities that all people do not equally share.
I hope it is more than national familiarity, however, that leads me to prefer much of the 
